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Donald Trump’s victory in the US election was, in significant 
part, a result of the inability of Democrats, the media and politi-
cal pundits to view Trump as anything other than an irrational 
and impulsive firebrand. A less hysterical and emotionally-driven 
reaction to Trump’s campaign would have provided a sounder ba-
sis for defeating him. This is because there was a strategic thread 
running through Trump’s bellicosity that practically every Demo-
crat and liberal failed to see. His often contradictory statements 
on a range of issues bewildered his opponents, diverting attention 
away from the cunning strategic moves he was making through-
out the campaign. This article outlines some often overlooked rea-
sons behind Trump’s victory, some of which may surprise.
The first element of Trump’s success lay in his choice of per-
sonnel. Specifically, after weeks of controversy that embroiled 
Trump’s first campaign manager, Corey Lewandowsky, Trump 
made a surprising change. On 17 August his campaign an-
nounced that long-time Republican campaign manager and poll-
ster, Kellyanne Conway, and executive chair of Breitbart News, 
Steve Bannon, would be brought on board. Conway would act as 
Trump’s campaign manager, while Bannon was elevated to chief 
executive. The differing reputations of the two could not have 
been starker. Conway was widely respected across the Republican 
establishment as a professional and measured operator. Bannon, 
on the other hand, was seen as the ultimate outsider and mischief-
maker: a man who had presided over the transformation of Breit-
bart News from a conservative website that characterised itself as 
‘the Huffington Post of the right’ into a champion of what is now 
known as the ‘alt-right’, a movement that embraces American 
(often white) nationalism, rejects mainstream conservativism and 
opposes immigration, multiculturalism and political correctness.1 
To most people, the ideas Bannon represented went against the 
tide of history, where liberal democracies such as the United States 
(and New Zealand) embrace openness and tolerance. 
To outsiders, the Bannon–Conway tandem seemed the odd-
est of pairings, and one destined to generate dysfunction at the 
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highest levels of Trump’s campaign. But the shakeup was made 
precisely when it was called for. It followed the nadir of his cam-
paign in the middle weeks of August. At this point Nate Silver’s 
538 election forecast website (which successfully forecast the re-
sults of every US state during the 2012 US election) gave Trump 
only a 10.8 per cent chance of winning the presidency.2 After the 
rearrangement of senior personnel in his campaign, chance of suc-
cess would never reach such a low point again. 
The personnel change had the effect of shoring up Trump’s 
position and would ultimately sharpen Trump’s campaign mes-
saging. For a start, by having Conway on board, it sewed up his 
flank with parts of the Republican establishment, who had threat-
ened to abandon him in droves. Conway not only performed as 
Trump’s manager but also acted as his surrogate repeatedly on 
America’s largest cable news networks. You could not turn on Fox 
News, CNN or CNBC for long before Conway appeared and 
delivered defences of Trump’s outlandish rhetoric and positions 
with a measured and sure tone that conveyed reassurance. 
Bannon, for his part, and irrespective of his controversial 
stewardship of Breitbart News, had his finger on the pulse of 
the American electorate. In 2014 Bannon delivered a speech via 
Skype to the Vatican, where he explained that one of the moti-
vating forces behind the rise of populist parties in the West was 
economic forces unleashed by the tide of globalisation that had 
been extending across large parts of the globe since the 1980s, 
and that seemed to work against working class people. Bannon 
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stated that through this crisis of capitalism, a centre-right populist 
movement was emerging out of the working classes opposed to 
the elites that ran their countries.3 To Bannon, Breibart News was 
the platform for this voice in America. Bannon would take this 
insight with him into the Trump campaign and make Trump’s 
appeal to the working classes of America razor sharp. 
The Conway–Bannon strategy played out to great effect, al-
lowing Trump-leaning voters to see in Trump’s behaviour what 
they wanted to see. This was evident during Trump’s seemingly 
bizarre trip to Mexico on 31 August to meet and hold a press 
conference with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. Prior to 
this, Trump had said that Mexican migrants crossing the border
 have lots about problems, and they’re bringing those prob-
lems  with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime.
They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.’4
Despite this earlier rhetoric, Trump was calm during the press 
conference, leading some to suggest that Conway was making 
real progress in restraining ‘the Don’. However, Trump followed 
his subdued trip to Mexico by delivering a raucous immigration 
speech to his followers in Arizona on the same night, during which 
he reaffirmed his hard-line immigration policy and declared that 
Mexico would pay for a wall along the US–Mexico border.5 This 
had all the hallmarks of Bannon’s influence. In the space of a sin-
gle day Trump had made an unprecedented trip to Mexico, where 
he acted with moderation, showing that he was capable of acting 
presidential to moderate Republican voters hesitant about voting 
for him, and also showed his base with diehard fans at his Arizona 
rally that he was not abandoning his core hard-line immigration 
policy. 
Trump would utilise this contradictory approach over and over 
again throughout the campaign to great effect, reassuring both his 
moderate and hard-line supporters that he remained committed 
to them even if his behaviour was, at other times, contradictory. 
Owing to their success, Conway and Bannon have been rewarded 
handsomely by Trump, with Conway offered a job as counsellor 
to Trump and Bannon now acting as Trump’s chief strategist in 
the White House.
A third key member of Trump’s team that led him to victory 
is his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who harnessed social media to 
the campaign’s advantage. Kushner and his digital team utilised 
low-tech policy videos that garnered 74 million hits.6 Micro-tar-
geting inundated Trump-leaning voters with his blunt messaging 
and enabled the campaign to sell hats and t-shirts with Trump’s 
‘Make American Great Again’ slogan, turning people into human 
billboards. Trump’s campaign expenditure is a testament to this, 
as spending on traditional television and online advertising was 
marginalised in favour of using Twitter and Facebook to drive 
the campaign to get the message out and monitor the shifting 
mood of voter sentiment. Trump’s Federal Election Commission 
filings through to mid-October showed that he only spent half of 
what Clinton’s campaign did, showing the dividends from this 
unorthodox approach. Again, the mainstream media called this 
approach untested and likely to fail in the face of the Clinton 
campaign’s formidable ‘get out the vote’ infrastructure. But as 
the leader of Trump’s data hub, Brad Parscale, said, not only was 
the data operation used to decide virtually every campaign deci-
sion (travel, fundraising, advertising, rally locations and topics of 
speeches) but also Kushner ‘put all the different pieces together. 
And what’s funny is the outside world was so obsessed about this 
little piece or that, they didn’t pick up that it was all being orches-
trated so well’.7
The final core person of  Trump’s team was himself, mocked 
by celebrities, the source of joke fodder for late night comedy 
shows and taunted and ridiculed by bloggers and political pun-
dits the world over. The question most of us could not get over 
was how could this guy actually win? We all tuned in to see Trump 
during the election debates, not because we wanted to see some-
thing serious but because we hoped for a spectacle. And boy did 
he deliver. Facing what was supposed to be the most impressive 
Republican line up ever assembled, Trump went on the offensive 
with a series of rhetorical fireworks that involved ridiculing his op-
ponents with school-yard taunts (‘little Marco!’, ‘lying Ted’) and 
declaring that ‘politicians are stupid’. But this was only the begin-
ning. The bombastic nature of Trump’s rhetoric escalated from 
day to day, week to week and debate to debate. It came to the 
point where no single outrageous thing Trump said, and which 
would have been a campaign killer for a normal candidate, really 
dented his campaign. Trump, by disregarding with such vigour 
all norms of political behaviour and political correctness, shifted 
the public’s sense of what was acceptable for a politician to say. 
He desensitised the public, all the while generating headlines that 
kept him on the front pages of every newspaper in America and 
giving his speeches prime time coverage on cable news networks.
Media role
The US media played a major role in the creation of the Trump 
phenomenon. Personally, I was stunned during a trip to Atlanta 
early last year when I saw that both Fox News and CNN would 
broadcast Trump speeches in full during prime time television. 
This allowed his message to reach millions of Americans who 
would otherwise not be paying much attention to the election (it 
is hard for us to understand in an outwardly-focused nation like 
New Zealand but many Americans do not follow their country’s 
politics very closely). The cable networks, driven by profits, were 
only too willing to shower attention on Trump, aware of the mas-
sive ratings and advertising revenue this would generate. Speaking 
on the role his channel played, CNN Chief Jeff Zucker publicly 
admitted that
 We probably did put on too many of the campaign rallies 
in the early months unedited… in hindsight we probably 
shouldn’t have done that as much… We put them on because 
we never knew what he was going to say. They did also attract 
quite a bit of an audience.8 
Rather than realise that this was an enabler for Trump to deliver 
his message into the deepest reaches of the American homeland, 
the US media missed the mark. 
A typical story of this was released by Politico which, writing 
about Trump’s dominance of the airways, suggested that it had 
likely ‘doomed him’. Yet a study from Harvard’s Kennedy School 
of Government showed that throughout 2015 and in the lead-
up to the Republican primaries, major news media delivered an 
unusually high volume of coverage despite Trump’s low polling 
numbers at the time. Furthermore, Trump received more good 
press than bad, helping to elevate him to the top of Republican 
polls.9 Other analysts claim that the media coverage he received 
during the primaries totalled $2 billion in free advertising. An-
other study at the University of Wisconsin explained that ‘Trump 
proved himself uniquely able to satisfy the imperative of dominat-
ing the news agenda, entering the news cycle… and repeatedly 
re-entering it, with stories and initiatives so that subsequent news 
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coverage is set on your terms’.10 
In other words, Trump played the media like a fiddle, and it 
redounded to his immense benefit. When the media did eventu-
ally turn on Trump and began fact checking him and calling him 
a serial liar, it could not prevent his victory as Trump turned his 
attention to using social media to get his message out. No doubt, 
Trump was aided by the fact that a majority of the American 
populace no longer trusted the mainstream media, with a Gallup 
poll in September showing that only 32 per cent of Americans 
trusted the media ‘to report the news fully, accurately and fairly’, 
the lowest level on record in Gallup polling history.11 Ultimately, 
to Trump, any exposure was good exposure, and he manipulated 
the public’s thirst for outrage to his advantage unlike any political 
candidate in modern times.
Effective campaigning
Another key element of Trumps’ strategy involved that most 
fundamental method of electoral politicking — campaigning. 
Throughout a gruelling 2016 schedule Clinton held approxi-
mately 278 rallies and speeches compared to Trump’s 302.12 
Trump’s speeches were, on average, larger, with the largest rally 
held by Clinton totalling between 14,000 and 18,000 compared 
to 28,000 for Trump.13 Admittedly, Clinton did have a star-
studded line-up of surrogates that included Joe Biden, Michelle 
and Barack Obama, who fanned out across the country to stump 
for her, while music stars like Bruce Springsteen and Lady Gaga 
played shows in her honour. But ultimately a candidate rises or 
falls based upon their own strengths and US voters did not feel 
they were voting for Obama’s legacy; they felt they were voting for 
Clinton herself. 
What was probably more important was where the candidates 
chose to campaign, especially in the final weeks. Again, much of 
the media missed the logic behind Trump’s strategy. During this 
critical period Trump targeted the US ‘rustbelt’, comprised of 
the north-eastern states of Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Penn-
sylvania. The economies of these states had once been home to 
America’s formidable industrial steel industry, but this had been 
devastated by economic change in recent decades. Trump realised 
that the memories, sometimes highly romanticised, held by the 
citizens of these states of a more affluent and hopeful past made 
them especially susceptible to Trump’s message that he would 
bring jobs back to the American working class and ‘Make Amer-
ica Great Again’ (this was not much different to the underlying 
appeal of the Brexit campaign’s slogan in the United Kingdom 
that they would help people ‘take back control’ from faceless elites 
in Brussels). Yet the rustbelt states were part of Clinton’s ‘blue fire-
wall’ — a number of states that had voted for Democrats in four 
out of the last six elections and that were assumed to be firmly in 
the Democratic camp. Polls taken throughout the election sup-
ported this notion, showing Trump trailing Clinton in Michigan 
and Wisconsin by up to seven percentage points, a seemingly in-
surmountable lead. Beyond these states were a number of ‘bat-
tleground states’ where the polls were tighter, but Trump was also 
generally trailing. Trump needed to win, at a minimum, not only 
the battleground states but also one or two of Clinton’s ‘firewall’ 
states. 
In the final weeks Trump made campaign stops in the Rust-
belt states. The media seemed baffled by this move, casting it as 
a desperate and misguided play by Trump. They asserted that, in 
light of the polls, he would be better served to go after the bat-
tleground states. But this missed the point that there was always 
a higher probability that some of the battleground states would 
tilt towards Trump. So with time running short it was impera-
tive that Trump take a gamble and try wrenching rustbelt states 
out of Clinton’s firewall, without which he could not win even if 
he won the battleground states. In other words, it was absolutely 
strategically the right move for Trump to target the rustbelt. The 
erroneous accusations that Trump’s campaign was misguided in 
its decision-making was characteristic of the Democrats’ approach 
time and time again throughout the election, and even Obama 
would go on to criticise Clinton’s campaign strategy after the elec-
tion when he stated that 
 good ideas don’t matter if people don’t hear them…We have 
to compete everywhere. We have to show up everywhere… I 
won Iowa not because the demographics dictated that I would 
win Iowa. It was because I spent 87 days going to every small 
town and fair and fish fry.14 
Persuasion power
The final key part of Trump’s strategy lay in his power of persua-
sion. For over a year now Scott Adams, creator of the syndicated 
Dilbert cartoon, but also a trained hypnotist who understands 
the power of persuasion, had been applying his expertise to the 
US election. He explained that Trump displayed potent skills, la-
belling him ‘the best persuader I have ever seen. On a scale from 
1 to 10… Trump is a 15.’15 According to Adams, our emotions 
underlie the vast majority of our decision-making, which we like 
to think is rational and based on facts. After witnessing Trump’s 
behaviour over a year ago, Adams predicted that Trump would 
win the election. Using what he called the ‘Master Persuasion 
Filter’, Scott meticulously catalogued the rhetorical ‘tit for tat’ 
of the campaign between Trump and his opponents, showing at 
each turn how what appeared to be absurd statements often had 
a logic behind them. Consider Trump’s labelling of his political 
opponents. Marco Rubio was dubbed ‘little Marco’; Jeb Bush be-
came ‘low energy Jeb’; Ted Cruz got tarred with ‘lying Ted’ and, 
of course, Hillary Clinton got stuck with ‘crooked Hillary’. Like 
characters in a play, Trump cast his opponents as characters in the 
most simplest of fashions. And boy did the labels not only stick 
but behind them lay a simplistic method that operated on our 
cognitive biases. For example, consider Jeb Bush, part of the Bush 
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dynasty that produced two US presidents over the past 30 years. 
Mild mannered, Bush comes across at first like a rational chief 
executive that would not be easily flustered during crises. Surely 
a man the people could elect. Immediately after Trump labelled 
him as ‘low energy’ what we then saw in Jeb confirmed the label. 
Bush did look like a man devoid of excitement, charisma or en-
ergy who was attempting to match the ‘high energy’ of Trump, 
which he clearly could not. The label stuck. Low energy equated 
to someone the American people were not going to vote for in a 
very loud American election. 
The same went for ‘crooked Hillary’. This lent itself perfectly 
to Trump’s labelling strategy. By labelling Hillary as a ‘crook’ for 
months on end — a person who is dishonest or criminal — it 
primed us to see her this way at a time when an email controversy 
was dogging the Clinton campaign. Once the label was used, it 
created a ‘confirmation bias trap’, and thus even the admission by 
FBI Director James Comey that Clinton had not acted criminally 
could not change the perception amongst large parts of the voting 
public that Clinton was dishonest. No other candidate in the elec-
tion, besides Trump, had such an excellent grasp of these tactics.  
Trump’s audacity
Was there strategy behind Trump’s ascent or was it dumb luck? 
Let us consider the following: after every Trump campaign shake-
up, Trump’s opponents loudly declared his campaign was marred 
by general incompetence; after every outrageous statement that 
gave Trump free media coverage, his opponents asserted that it 
made him unelectable; after every campaign stop in Clinton’s sup-
posed ‘blue firewall’, his opponents stated that it would have been 
prudent for him to campaign elsewhere and that he was wasting 
his time. In other words, during all these calculated steps, Trump’s 
opponents disregarded them as impulsive and likely to fail. They 
viewed them through a traditional political lens that no longer 
applied in an era of popular angst and during an extraordinary 
election. 
Behind the baffling swings in Trump’s behaviour and non-
traditional approach to campaigning, and which will no doubt 
lie behind his approach to governing, lies a logic that has worked 
well for him so far. That is the audacity of Trump. If the Demo-
crats hope to take back the White House in four years’ time, and 
the rest of us watching from afar want to understand the populist 
phenomenon which could conceivably come to our own shores in 
time (especially if New Zealand is shaken by economic turbulence 
in the near future), it is imperative that we understand that there 
is a logical thread that runs through Trump’s seemingly irrational 
behaviour. In other words, even if it appears that Trump is a buf-
foon who was lucky enough to somehow rise to become the most 
powerful human on the planet, our best bet is to try to see beyond 
Trump’s outlandish comments to the stratagem of a man of con-
siderable cunning.
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